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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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In order to understand how this method was applied under the specific
conditions of the Second Great War, it is necessary to recall Moscov/s
ancient methods of conquest. Russia's policy towards her next victim,
i.e., her neighbour, invariably followed the same sequence of events :—
the invention of a claim to the borderland and the search for any discon-
tented element in that country to serve her ends. Next, the creation of
the means whereby they (Moscow) could intervene in the internal life of
the country under the slogans * help for the oppressed,,' for £ justice and
freedom.5 Then the invasion, aggression and extermination of the leader
element, and the deportation of a great percentage of the inhabitants.
Finally, the complete incorporation and russification of the country with
a close binding to the central authority—Moscow. Thus, in a short
space of time, there would be no trace of the nation so overwhelmed by
this assistance from Russia.
Eastern Poland had already gone through various stages of this Russian
programme but, owing to the German invasion and subsequent Russian
withdrawal, it had not been completed. So Moscow had to begin the
task again from the first item. They manufactured a number of
claims which were to cover the annexation of Eastern Poland—racial,
humane, self-determination of the population, and strategic ones, but
none of these seemed sufficient to embrace the incorporation of Poland
as a whole into the U.S.S.R. However, after the * election 5 experiment
in the Baltic States and Eastern Poland, the Kremlin had decided that it
might be possible to invent a plausible title to this country. In fact
Stalin, in his letter to the Moscow correspondent of The Times on May 4,
1943, gave a clear indication of his intention to establish such a claim.
To the correspondent's question " on what fundamentals, in your opinion,
should the relation between Poland and the U.S.S.R. be based after the
war ? " Stalin had replied : " . . . solid neighbourly relations ... or,
should the Polish people so desire, upon the fundamentals of an alliance."
The world had already been given amazing figures which represented
the number of people who had e so desired' the Communist order in the
Baltic States and Eastern Poland and who had c requested' to be in-
corporated into the Soviet Union. The N.K.V.D. was able to produce
this * desire * in a masterly fashion in the occupied countries. The
powerful apparatus of Moscow propaganda through its Polish Department
of the ex-Comintern, and by its method of promoting obscure individuals
as eminent citizens, would have no difficulty in announcing to the world
at large that the c genuine voice of Poland 5 had expressed this or that
desire beneficial to the interests of the Soviet Union.
P-- Thus did the Kremlin begin to carry put its moral conquest of the
opponent. In comparison with Hitler's methods, there was a tremendous
progress in the development of psychological warfare in this domain. In
1938-1939* the latter had limited his action to two main factors—diplo-